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vide him with an opportunity to refuse to 
speak with his wife, or tell him in advance 
that police officer would be present and 
the conversation recorded. The majority 
found no evidence to suggest that the 
police had acted to allow the meeting "for 
the purpose of eliciting incriminating 
statements," Id. at 1936, and upheld the 
trial judge's decision to admit the taped 
conversation. Indeed, the Court found the 
officers acted to discourage the meeting 
entirely, and only stipulated to having an 
-officer present to ensure the safety of Mrs. 
Mauro.Id. 
The opinion espoused by the Court in 
Mauro narrows the interpretation of Innis 
with respect to action by the police in lieu 
of direct interrogation of suspects. The 
Court now permits the police to obtain by 
proxy that which they can not obtain 
directly, voluntary self-incriminating state-
ments made in the course of a pre-
detention meeting between an accused and ' 
a spouse. Such statements may now be 
used against a defendant at trial~ despite 
police orchestration of and participation in 
any such meeting, and notwithstanding 
the defendant's prior assertion of his 
Miranda rights under the fifth amendment. 
- Mark Brugh 
Maryland v. Garrison: GOOD-FAITH 
MISTAKE IN VALID BUT 
OVERBROAD SEARCH WARRANT 
DOES NOT INVAUDATE SEARCH 
As a result of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Maryland 'D. Garrison, 
U.S. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987), the Rehnquist 
Court has carved, yet, another good-faith 
exception to the warrant requirement. In 
Garrison, the Court held that' a factual mis-
take made in good-faith by police officers 
did not invalidate a broader than appro-
priate Search warrant or its accompanying 
search. The search, the Court explained, 
was only limited by the police officers' dis-
covery of their factual mistake. 
In Garrison, "Baltimore police officers 
obtained and executed a warrant to search 
the person of Lawrence McWebb and the 
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue 
third floor apartment." Id. at 1014. The 
search was for controlled substances and 
related paraphernalia. 
At the time the police obtained the war-
rant and began their search they were of 
the belief that only one apartment existed 
on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue. 
Information was obtained from an infor-
mant that McWebb was selling marijuana 
from this third floor apartment. A tele-
phone call to the Baltimore Gas and Elec-
tric Company confirmed that there was 
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one apartment situated on the third floor, 
thereby corroborating the police officers' 
belief. Although the police inspected the 
outside of the seven unit building, the 
building was not approached until the war-
rant was executed. The third floor, which 
had a common doorway and vestibule, was 
divided into two separate units - one 
belonging to McWebb and the other to 
respondent, Garrison. Before the police 
officers became aware of their mistake, 
they searched' Garrison's apartment and 
seized contraband in violation of 
Maryland's Controlled Substances Act. 
Md. Ann. Code art. 27 §276 (1957). 
A Maryland trial court denied Garri-
son's motion to suppress the evidence seiz-
ed from his apartment. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. Id. 
58 Md. App. 417, 473, A.2d 514 (1984). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland revers-
ed. 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985). 
In a 6-3 decision, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, divided the case 
into two constitutional issues. The first 
considered the validity of the warrant and 
the second, the reasonableness of the way 
the police officers executed the warrant. 
As to the validity of the warrant, "[t]he 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment categorically prohibits the issuance 
of any warrant except one particularly 
describing the place to be search and the 
person's or things to be seized." Id. at 
1017. Because Garrison made no claim that 
the warrant did not adequately describe 
"the persons or things to be seized" or 
that there was no probable cause to believe 
that they might be in "the place to be sear-
ched" as specified in the warrant, the 
Court held that this Fourth Amendment 
particularity-of-description requirement 
was met. The issue, Stevens said, becomes 
"whether that factual mistake (i.e., believ-
ing only McWebb's apartment existed on 
the third floor) iqvalidated a warrant that 
undoubtedly would have been valid if it 
had reflected a completely accurate 
understanding of the building's floor 
plan." Id. 
This issue, Stevens continued, turns on 
the constitutionality of the police officers' 
"conduct in light of the information 
available to them at the time they acted." 
Id. The majority found that the police offi-
cers reasonable believed, based on the 
information they had gathered, that only 
McWebb's apartment occupied the third 
floor. Thus, the Court concluded, "the 
warrant, insofar as it authorized a search 
that turned out ambiguous in scope, was 
valid when it issued." Id. at 1018. 
Next, the Court addressed the 
reasonableness of the way in which the 
police officers executed the warrant. The 
majority stated that the police had gained 
access to the third floor common area 
legally; "they carried a search warrant and 
they were accompanied by McWebb who 
provided the key to the third floor." Id. at 
1018. Thus, the Court only considered the 
police officers' conduct in executing the 
warrant once they entered the third floor 
common area. 
The majority stated that the police offi-
cers were required to discontinue the sear-
ch of Garrison's apartment once they 
discovered or should have discovered that 
the third floor contained two apartments 
instead of the assumed one. However, "the 
Court has also recognized the need to 
allow some latitude for honest mistakes 
that are made by officers in the dangerous 
and difficult process of making arrests and 
executing search warrants." Id. at 1018. 
Citing HiD 'D. California, 401 U.s. 797 
(1971), for the proposition that honest mis-
takes in arrests obviate' Fourth Amend-
ment concerns, the majority held that "the 
officers' conduct was consistent with a 
reasonable effort to ascertain and identify 
the place intended to be searched within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
Id. at 1019. Before their discovery of the 
factual mistake, the majority stated the 
officers understandably and reasonably 
believed that "McWebb's apartment and 
the third-floor premises as one and the 
same." Id. 'The execution of the warrant, 
the majority held, reasonably included the 
entire third floor and consequently, the 
contraband found on that floor was prop-
erly admissible. 
Justice Blackmun, along the Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented. A person, 
Blackmun opined, has the highest expecta-
tion of privacy in his home, whether it be 
a mobile home, a unit in a multiple-
occupancy dwelling, or the most majestic 
mansion. Indeed, "the physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed." Id. at 1020. (Blackmum, J. dis-
senting) Therefore, absent one of the war-
rant requirement exceptions as stated in 
Coolidge 'D. New Hampshsire, 403 U.S. 443, 
478 (1971), a warrantless search of a home 
is presumptively unreasonable. 
In concluding, that the search of Garri-
son's apartment was warrantless and there-
fore improper, the dissent did not believe 
the particularity-of-description require-
ment of the search warrant was met. This 
particularity requirement applies with 
equal force to multi-unit buildings as to 
individual private homes, requiring that 
the targeted unit be described with enough 
specificity to prevent a search of all units. 
Garrison at 107 S.Ct. 1021. When applying 
this long standing law to this case, the dis-
sent found that the warrant specified that 
only McWebb's apartment could be sear-
ched. Therefore, the search of Garrison's 
apartment was warrantless and because the 
state did not advance any exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, all evidence seized 
from the search should have been suppress-
ed. 
In addition, the dissent found the majori-
ty's analysis concerning the reasonableness 
of the way in which the warrant was 
executed to be unpersuasive. Because 
multiple-occupancy buildings are now 
common, the conduct of the officers could 
hardly be deemed reasonable. The dissent 
found any reasonable basis for the search 
to be lacking because the police failed to 
thoroughly investigate the premises before 
obtaining the warrant; failed to question 
Garrison prior to beginning the search as 
to the location of his residence, and failed 
to take into account the obvious lay-out of 
the third floor which revealed two sepa-
rate apartments. As viewed by the dissent, 
these facts, would have enabled a 
reasonable officer to realize the factual 
mistake before any contraband was seized. 
Garrison, provides another example of 
the Supreme Court's willingness to broad-
en the good-faith exception to the warrant 
requirement. Although case-by-case analy-
sis can only determine if the good-faith 
exception to the warrant requirement has 
been fulfilled, if Garrison is the benchmark 
by which good-faith is measured then it 
seems clear that in most cases good-faith 
will be found. 
- Amy Kushner 
First English Evangelical Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles: 
TIlE EVOLUTION OF THE JUST 
COMPENSATION CLAUSE-
COURT REQUIRES MONETARY 
COMPENSATION FOR 
TEMPORARY REGULATORY 
TAKING OF PROPERTY 
Marred by a history of incomplete clari-
fication, the issue of whether a landowner 
is entitled to compensation for a tempo-
rary regulatory taking of property pursu-
ant to the Just Compensation Clause of 
the fifth amendment of the United States 
Constituion has finally been settled in First 
English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 
(1987), (First English). Historically, the 
remedy for a taking of property by inverse 
condemnation was invalidation of the 
unconstitutional regulation, but the 
United States Supreme Court in First 
English has authoritatively held in a 6-3 
decision that monetary relief is an accep-
table remedy. 
The First English Evangelical Church of 
Glendale owned and operated a camp 
(Lutherglen) for handicapped children in 
Angles Natural Forest. In February of 
1978 a storm flooded the watershed. The 
massive infusion of water forced the Mill 
Creek, which ran through Lutherglen, to 
overflow its banks. Consequently, the 
property was inundated, the buildings 
were destroyed and the camp was rendered 
useless unless rebuilt. 
Subsequently, in response to an everpre-
sent hazardous flood condition posed by 
an earlier topographic change in the Mill 
Creek Canyon, Los Angeles County 
adopted an ordinance, which read in part, 
"[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, 
place or enlarge any building or structure, 
any portion of which is, or will be, located 
within the outer boundry lines of the 
interim flood protection area located in 
Mill Creek Canyon." Id. at 2381-2382, 
cltmg Los Angeles, Ca., Interim 
Ordinance No. 11,855 (Jan. 1979) (empha-
sis added). The law adversely affected the 
Church's interest in Lutherglen, prohibit-
ing its reconstruction. 
In response to the regulation the Church 
filed suit in the Superior Court of Califor-
nia alleging that the law denied the church 
of all use of the property. FollowingAgins 
v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), the court 
denied relief by inverse condemnation. 
Agins stands for the proposition that main-
tenance of a suit for damages in inverse 
condemnation cases is the equivalent of 
coercing the state to exercise its eminent 
domain powers. Thus the only relief, in 
California, when a regulation was found a 
denial of a substantial amount of property 
rights would have been declaratory relief 
or mandamus. See, Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
On appeal, the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court decision 
on similar grounds and, "because the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on the question of whether a state 
may constitutionally limit the remedy for 
a taking to nonmonetary relief." 107 S.Ct. 
2383. The Church appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 478 U.S. -0 106 
S.Ct. 3292 (1986). In prior cases seeking to 
address the issue, the Court had refused to 
settle the matter because in those appeals 
the Court had deemed each case as "not 
ripe" or "lacking finality." Se~ Mac· 
Donald, Sommers and Frates v. Yolo Coun· 
ty 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986) (A lack of a fmal 
determination by a county planning board 
as to how to apply a regulation prevents a 
decision of whether a taking has occur-
red.), Williamson County Regional Plan 
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985) (Petitioners failure to exhaust 
all state remedies to resolve a situation, 
[i.e. application for a zoning variance, fol-
lowing state administrative procedures to 
collect compensation before filing suit,] 
renders the case as pending therefore pre-
cluding a decision by the Court for a lack 
of finality at the state level.), San Diego Gas 
andElec. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) 
(When a state court decision is not final, 
the Court cannot review the case pursuant 
to 28 U.S.c. § 1257.), Agins v. Tiburon, 
4n U.S. 255 (1980). 
Despite the fact that the ordinance had 
yet to be deemed unconstitutional as a tak-
ing of property without providing just 
compensation, the Court did address the 
compensation issue. Seegenerally, 107 S.Ct. 
at 2389-2390 (Where the dissenting opin-
ion refuses to agree with the majority 
opinion because of the "lack of finality" 
issue). 
In its opinion, the Court noted that the 
Just Compensation clause of the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion applies to the states throught the four-
teenth amendment. Therefore, a state is 
required to financially compensate a prop-
erty owner for an actual physical taking. 
Furthermore, under Mahon, a regulation 
may be so excessive that it works a taking 
under inverse condemnation theory, deny-
ing the property owner of the use of the 
land without taking the property itself. Id. 
at 2386. The Court perceived no difference 
in the circumstances when a state physical-
ly deprives a landowner of its rights by 
eminent domain and when the deprava-
tion is perpetrated by regulatory encroach-
ment. Thus, because there are not 
distinguishing differences between emi-
nent domain and inverse condemnation 
takings, the Court held that the just com-
pensation clause warrants monetary com-
pensation in the regulatory taking 
situation. 
Under the facts in First English, the 
petitioner-Church alleged a taking for the 
period commencing from the time when 
the ordinance because effective accruing 
up until when the regulation would be 
struck down. Typically, U[o]nce a court 
determines that a taking has occurred, the 
government retains the whole range of 
options already available-amendment of 
the regulation, withdrawal of the inva-
lidated regulation, or the exercise of emi-
nent domain," Id. at 2389, thus leaving the 
property owner harmed for the period of 
time in which the law was effective. Until 
First English. landowners had no oppor-
tunity to recover damages for the "regula-
tory wrongs" of local government. 
Siding with the Church's argument, the 
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